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Film Review 
The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the 
Fact-Finding Process? 
By Bennett L. Gershmant 
Prosecutors in Dallas have said for years, "Any prosecutor 
can convict a guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor to convict an 
innocent man."' 
On November 28, 1976, about half-past midnight, on North 
Hampton Road in Dallas, Texas, Police Officer Robert Wood 
was shot to death at point blank range by the driver of a Mer- 
cury Comet. The killer sped away leaving no clues. After a 
month-long investigation, the police arrested Randall Dale 
Adams and charged him with the murder. Adams, who had no 
prior record, was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death.2 
Twelve years later, Adams' case is the subject of an ex- 
traordinary film, The Thin Blue Line.s Blending monologues, 
restagings, old movie clips, visual artifacts, newspaper accounts, 
maps, drawings, photographs, and police reports, the documen- 
tary meticulously dissects what is known about the case and the 
identity of the killer. In much the same manner that the 
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I would like to thank my col- 
leagues, Professors Donald L. Doernberg, Lissa Griffin, M. Stuart Madden, and Barbara 
Salken for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am also grateful to 
my secretary, Ms. Judith Caporale, for her assistance. 
I would like to dedicate this Article to my late colleague and friend, Dean Philip B. 
Blank. 
1. Transcript, The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, Inc. 1988), at  40 
[hereinafter Transcript] (defense attorney Melvyn Bruder). 
2. State v. Adams, F-77-1286-1 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, 577 
S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (19801, 
on remand 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). 
3. Miramax Films (1988). 
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Kennedy assassination still consumes us, the film projects a 
quality of urgency that rivets our attention. A haunting, pul- 
sating score accentuates the tension. We are drawn inexorably 
into a psychological twilight zone of lies, deceptions, contradic- 
tions, and mistakes. The result is a portrayal, more vivid than 
any judicial decision or fictional account, of the vulnerability of 
the adversarial process of criminal justice, and the ease with 
which an innocent man could be put to death. 
The film's central visual motif - which recurs again and 
again with nightmarish intensity - shows Officer Wood ap- 
proaching the side of the car he had stopped, apparently for fail- 
ing to illuminate its headlights. The window rolls down, and five 
gunshots explode into Wood's body and head. Who did it? Why? 
Each time we view this macabre tableau we search the gray 
shadows and blurred outlines for clues. In each revisitation, 
however, the scene changes, reinvented and transformed in the 
myriad ways that we, as well as police investigators and wit- 
nesses, might imagine i t  could have occurred. 
Through this kaleidoscope we are relentlessly exposed to 
the formidable task facing trial juries, especially the jury which 
decided Randall Adams' fate, of resolving the falsehoods, incon- 
- 
sistencies, and ambiguities inherent in discovering the truth 
about a historical event. Ironically, however, we probably assimi- 
late more relevant data in less than two hours than was im- 
parted through the legal process to the Adams jury. Further, 
through this cinematic art form, we very likely are better 
equipped than the Adams jury to resolve the factual issues. It is 
a profoundly depressing experience. Indeed, the film's account of 
police myopia, judicial arrogance, witness corruption, and 
prosecutorial misconduct, has provided the impetus, as well as 
leads to actual evidence, for Adams' recent vindication.' 
4. Apparently, Errol Morris, the director of the film, was given access to the prose- 
cutor's files in the case that disclosed exculpatory information never revealed to Adams' 
attorneys. Moreover, his interviews with witnesses produced statements that contra- 
dicted their trial testimony. See Singer, Predilections, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 1989, a t  
63; Applebaum, "Blue Line" Aftermath: New Trial for Convict, N. Y. Times, Dec. 8, 
1988, at C19, col. 5. As this Article was being completed, a Texas judge, following an 
evidentiary hearing on Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus, granted the appli- 
cation and recommended a new trial. Ex Parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) 
(Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
On March 21, 1989, Adams was released from jail and will not be retried. See infra note 
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Part I of this Commentary objectively analyzes the film, fo- 
cusing on its monologues, dramatizations, and exhibits. The 
film's organizational structure roughly parallels the stages of the 
criminal justice process, from the investigation and arrest of Ad- 
ams to his trial, conviction, sentence, and post-conviction litiga- 
tion. The prologue and epilogue unify the story. Part I1 attempts 
to explain the bizarre judicial result, focusing on the prosecutor's 
dominant role in the criminal justice process. I t  concludes, as 
does the film, that one of the fundamental features of our legal 
system - the intrinsic ability of the adversary process to dis- 
cover the truth6 - cannot function when weighed down by 
prosecutorial misconduct. Part 111 analyzes the film's epistemo- 
logical conclusion that although ultimate truth is unknowable, 
the artist's version of the truth can be superior to the official 
version arrived a t  by law. Part IV offers a brief conclusion and 
brings the case up-to-date. 
I. Documentary Dramatization of a Murder Case 
The film's prologue immediately introduces the overriding 
conflict between Adams' version of the events and that of the 
prosecution's chief witness, David Harris. Although legally re- 
solved by the jury, it remains a mystery. I t  is immediately ap- 
parent that either Adams or Harris killed Officer Wood. The 
viewer's task, and the jury's as well, is straightforward: any 
information which inculpates Harris necessarily exculpates 
Adams, and vice versa. 
Adams - the camera depicts a somber, expressionless man 
in white prison attire - relates, almost in a monotone, how he 
and his brother left Ohio in October, 1976, looking for work out 
160 and accompanying text. 
5. See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1950); FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 
(1978); Damaska, Euidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Pro- 
cedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973); Frankel, The Search for 
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); See also Tehan v. United 
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic purpose of a trial is the deter- 
mination of truth"). But see Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discou- 
ery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963) (trial not a search for truth). 
For an interesting discussion of various theories of the American adversary system, 
see Goodpaster, On The Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987). 
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West. They arrived in Dallas on Thursday, November 25th' 
where Adams immediately found employment. "Everything 
clicked. It's as if I was meant to be here.'7e By contrast, David 
Harris - the camera reveals a cordial, personable young man 
in bright red attire - was a sixteen-year-old misfit with a long 
juvenile record. Harris stated, "I took a pistol from my dad and 
a shotgun - took a neighbor's car. I think I had broken into 
their house or something and got the keys to it. . . . Ended up 
coming to Dallas."? 
The camera shifts back and forth between Adams and Har- 
ris. Adams explains that his car ran out of gas on his way home 
from work and "a person . . . pulled over . . . and asked me if I 
needed any help.'78 Harris then describes how he picked up 
Adams and drove him home. Their stories seem to mesh. They 
agree that they spent the evening together drinking beer, smok- 
ing marijuana, and going to the movies. What else did they do 
together? When did they part? Why did they even meet? There 
is an existential quality which Adams himself expresses: "Why 
did I meet this kid? I don't know. Why did I run out of gas at  
that time? I don't know. But it hap~ened . "~  The harrowing 
dramatization of the killing - along with the flashing red light 
atop the police car - suddenly interrupts this dialogue, con- 
veying the stark realization that a t  least one other person knew 
the killer's identity - Officer Wood. 
The film, in the mode of a detective thriller, now moves to 
the investigative phase. We learn that the police immediately fo- 
cused their attention on the recollections of Police Officer 
Teresa Turko, who was Wood's partner that night. Exactly what 
Turko saw has always been a baffling question, vividly depicted 
in the film. Turko, who is not interviewed in the film, was indis- 
putably present when Wood was shot, and we see her in one 
simulated variation of the motif emptying her service revolver a t  
the car as it sped away. However, although she consistently 
maintained that there was only one occupant in the car, she 
6. Transcript, supra note 1, at 1 .  
7 .  Id.  
8. Id.  
9.  Id.  at 2. 
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could identify neither the car nor the killer.1° Turko was even 
hypnotized, but this failed to produce any leads." A chocolate 
milkshake she had been drinking, flying surreally in slow motion 
from her hand into the roadway (she and Wood had just left a 
fast-food restaurant) suggests, as depicted in another dramatiza- 
tion of the motif, that she was seated inside her patrol car and 
rushed out only after she heard the gunfire. 
Monologues by Dallas homicide investigators record their 
frustration: 
I t  was getting awfully close to Christmas. 
We still hadn't cleared it . . . [.I We'd never really gone that 
long in Dallas without clearing the murder of a police officer. 
We'd had several killed but we'd always cleared them pretty 
quick. And this case had gone a month, or nearly a month, and 
we still hadn't cleared it. However, we finally got the break that 
cleared it. . . [.I 
It  came out of Vidor, Texas.I2 
The film shifts to Vidor - a Texas road map helps locate the 
town - and the film returns to David Harris. 
Several of Harris' neighbors, enthusiastic participants, recall 
10. OfFicer Turko gave several contradictory reports to the police after the killing. 
She stated that she did not know the hair style of the driver, did not know whether the 
driver was black or white, male or female, and could not see into the car because "the 
window was too dirty to see through." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286- 
I(B) a t  6 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 
1, 1989). Several of these reports were never disclosed to Adams' attorneys, despite a 
court order. Turko's refreshed and rehearsed trial testimony, a t  variance with her earlier 
accounts, became crucial in convicting Adams. The prosecution's suppression of these 
reports was one of the grounds upon which the district court granted the writ. See id. a t  
5-7. 
11. Id. a t  7. The prosecution did not notify Adams' defense attorneys of Turko's 
hypnosis. I t  is not clear whether the hypnosis had any effect on Turko's testimony, 
wherein she claimed for the first time that  the driver had "bushy hair." Hypnosis did not 
trigger her recollection that the driver had bushy hair. In fact, she never told anyone 
that the driver had bushy hair until after she met with Assistant District Attorney 
Douglas Mulder to prepare her trial testimony. Id. 
The issue of hypnotically-refreshed testimony recently has become a prominent evi- 
dentiary issue in criminal litigation. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals has held that  hypnotically-enhanced testimony may be intro- 
duced a t  trial only after a determination by the trial court, outside the jury's presence, 
that the proponent established its trustworthiness by clear and convincing evidence. Zani 
v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
12. Transcript, supra note 1, a t  8. 
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that shortly after the murder, Harris bragged to them about kill- 
ing Wood. After a news broadcast about the case, for example, 
Harris "started swearing up and down. He said, 'I swear to 
God . . . I shot that fucking pig. . . . I'm the one that killed 
him.' "13 Harris even displayed to one of. his neighbors the .22 
caliber pistol he used, saying, "It's the one I shot him with, right 
here."14 Harris explained to his friends that after Wood pulled 
him over and came up' to the window, Harris "rolled down the 
window and just pulled the gun up and - Pow! - shot 
him."16 Harris "swore up and down" to others that he murdered 
the officer, "trying to get anybody and everybody to listen to 
him. . . ."Ie We watch these interviews incredulously. Did Harris 
really say those things? More importantly, was he telling the 
truth? 
Unconstrained by trial processes, the film attempts to travel 
into the mind of David Harris, to unravel its secrets. One 
method in this elusive quest, of course, is to record Harris him- 
self. To be sure, Harris testified a t  Adams' trial and was cross- 
examined," but one of the principal issues in the recent litiga- 
tion was the trial judge's limitation of the cross-examination.le 
Indeed, Harris' revelations in this film, as we later learn, differ 
drastically from his trial testimony. Early in the film, for in- 
stance, we discover that immediately after the killing, Harris re- 
turned to Vidor and went on a crime spree. 
Got back there, robbed an O'Bannion's 7-Eleven with a .22 
rifle. Committed some other burglaries and what have you. All 
this time I was on probation - juvenile probation. Eventually I 
turned myself in for this stuff in Vidor. I think I made a confes- 
13. Id. at 9 (statement of Hootie Nelson). 
14. Id. at  10. 
15. Id. at  9 (statement of Dennis Johnson). 
16. Id. (statement of Floyd Jackson). 
17. The importance of cross-examination to the fair and effective functioning of the 
adversary process is well known. According to Wigmore, cross-examination "is beyond 
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIG- 
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976). See also Alford v. United States, 282 
U.S. 687, 692 (1931) (cross-examination is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair 
trial"); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal 
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested"). 
18. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) a t  3-4 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 
Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
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sion or something. I can't even remember exactly. So I'm told I 
did.18 
The trial judge refused to allow the jury to hear about these 
crimes.20 
We also hear from several of Harris' acquaintances. One 
neighbor provides chilling insights into Harris' character: 
I seen David up in the bushes [soon after the Wood murder]. 
"Say, David, what are you doing in the bushes?" And . . . "Oh, 
man you ain't seen me." I said, "Why not? What's the deal?" He 
said, "Man, you just ain't seen me. You ain't seen me. Forget 
about seeing me, you know." Said, "Man, I've been having a real 
good time. Been robbing these houses and held up a couple of 
stores. . . [.I Got me a pistol." 
That completely just alienated him from the whole 
neighborhood. 
He didn't have a conscience. You know, if I do something 
bad, you know, it kind of gets to me, I feel, you know, "Shucks, I 
shouldn't have done that. I feel bad about it.'' Didn't bother him. 
Didn't bother him a t  
We further find out - a shattering discovery - that 
Harris is presently on death-row in Texas for a subsequent mur- 
der unrelated to the Wood killing, but strikingly similar in the 
manner in which the victim was killed. A newspaper headline 
and photographs of the victim accentuate the reality of that 
event. Police tell us that Harris broke into a home where Mark 
Mays and his girlfriend were alone. Harris forced Mays into the 
19. Transcript, supra note 1, at  19 (statement of David Harris). 
20. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Adams' defense counsel had not properly preserved 
the issue by failing to notify the trial court that he believed such proof was admissible to 
demonstrate bias and motive on the part of Harris. The transcript of the trial proceed- 
ings, however, reveals just the opposite, namely, that counsel repeatedly advised the 
court that proof of Harris' pending charges of two burglaries and an aggravated robbery 
was admissible to show bias and motive. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 a t  3-4 
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). After an evidentiary hearing on a federal writ of habeas 
corpus, a magistrate found that the trial judge's ruling excluding proof of these crimes, 
and the affirmance by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, were erroneous. The magis- 
trate concluded that "the finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals to the effect that 
counsel did not state that he wanted to demonstrate bias and motive on the part of 
Harris is not supported by the record." Adams v. Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G a t  6 
(N.D. Tex. filed May 13, 1988). 
21. Transcript, supra note 1, at  20 (emphasis in original). 
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bathroom a t  gunpoint and abducted the woman. When Mays 
chased after them, Harris shot him to death. A police officer de- 
scribes the killing: "[Wlhether it be two, three, or how many 
shots, I don't know - [Harris] . . . fired at point blank or near 
point-blank range."" 
Sam Kittrell, a young police officer in Vidor who had several 
encounters with Harris, is an important participant in the film. 
Kittrell interweaves a t  various points to describe Harris' ongoing 
criminal behavior and to provide eerie clues to Harris' personal- 
ity. Kittrell recalls that a Mercury Comet had been stolen, and 
Harris was seen abandoning the car and running away. Kittrell 
at  the time was hearing "little bits of information . . . that David 
had been involved in a shooting in Dallas of a police ~fficer."~' 
I asked him about . . . if he'd been to Dallas and he denied 
having been to Dallas. I asked him if he'd been involved in any 
type of shooting or knew anything about a shooting and he denied 
that to the end, which is fairly consistent with David. Even if he 
had of had some involvement, his first way that he always treats 
you he would deny. Then if he felt as though you really knew that 
he had done it, then he would be truthful about it.=' 
Harris told Kittrell where he could locate the murder weapon, 
directing him to a swampy area behind Harris' residence. 
Kittrell retrieved the gun which had been placed underwater in- 
side a sock sprayed with boot oil to prevent rust. 
Harris, whose gun was used to kill Wood, and who stole the 
murder car, becomes a suspect and faces a wide assortment of 
other serious criminal charges. He accuses ad am^.^^ Police de- 
22. Id. a t  45. 
23. Id. a t  8. 
24. Id. a t  9. 
25. The district court found: 
6. At the time of the interrogation, Harris was on juvenile probation for auto 
theft and burglary. In early December 1976, he had been arrested and confessed to 
three additional burglaries and an aggravated robbery. 
7. During interrogation about the Wood murder, Harris inquired as to what 
would happen to his pending charges if he had not killed Officer Wood but "knew 
who did." He was advised that the resolution of those charges would depend on 
the nature and extent of his cooperation in making a case against the perpetrator. 
8. After receiving this information, Harris accused applicant of committing the 
murder. 
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  1-2 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas 
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scriptions of their questioning of Harris are grimly humorous, 
almost parody. Harris, according to the police, "came clean" 
when he realized "they are going to send me to the penitentiary 
for the rest of my life . . . ."26 He told the police that he had 
been "just bragging about this. I didn't do it, but I . . . know who 
did do it."27 "[Olf course," recalled a detective, "he came clean 
then. He tried to hide no facts. He just seemed like a friendly 
kid. We didn't want to make him mad."28 "It wasn't very long 
until I realized that what he knew was the facts of the case and 
it matched perfectly with what we knew. And i t  had to be 
right."28 
Harris wryly recounts the version he gave the police: 
The story that I told, uh, was: we were . . . it was like twelve 
something, so it was the next day, uh, early in the morning. 
We were stopped and, uh, when we were stopped, the officer 
came up to the car and asked to see the driver's license or 
whatever, and he [Adams] just started shooting. 
I don't know why, but it's always seemed like time just 
stopped or something, you know. I mean, it didn't seem like any 
time passed, you know. 
It just seemed like, like it was . . . Boom! Time stopped or 
something. I don't know what it is, you know, uh. It's like a 
flash.30 
The film returns to Adams. The police arrested Adams on 
the evening of December 21st. ~ tched-f rom distance, through 
the window of an interrogation room in Dallas police headquar- 
ters, is the profile of a young Randall Adams. The striking inno- 
cence of the scene, strangely resembling an Edward Hopper 
painting, contrasts sharply with the accumulating tension. 
Adams recalls that a detective tried to force him to sign a con- 
fession: "I told him I couldn't. . . . [He] threw a pistol on the 
table. Asked me . . . to pick it up. I told him 'No'. . . . He 
threatened me. . . . He pulled his service revolver on me."31 
County), aff 'd ,  No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
26. Transcript, supra note 1, at 10. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 10-11 (statement of Marshall Touchton). 
29. Id. at 11 (statement of Gus Rose). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 2-3. 
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Statements by police personnel evoke laughter from some of 
the audience: "I had what I call a casual, friendly conversation 
with him to start with, to try to size him up . . . [alnd I found 
almost immediately that he didn't have very much con- 
science . . . . [H]e was the kind that didn't have a lot of re- 
morse for what he had done."32 "He showed no expression what- 
soever. "33 "He, of course, almost overacted his innocence: he 
protested he hadn't done anything, couldn't imagine why we 
were bringing him in. He didn't fight or he didn't resist. He just 
protested his i nn~cence . "~~  
ADAMS: 
"I kept telling them the same thing, the same thing, the 
same thing. . . [.I They didn't want to believe me."3" 
Adams told the police that after riding around with Harris 
they went to a drive-in movie, arriving around seven o'clock. 
Fused with Adams' recollections are actual film clips from that 
double feature, T h e  Student  Body and Swinging Cheerleaders. 
The time these two films were shown and when the theater 
closed became crucial issues a t  trial. A popcorn machine be- 
comes a tell-tale marker, used to dramatize Harris' trial testi- 
mony of when they left the movies: "Went to buy popcorn . . . a 
few minutes before midnight."3s 
ADAMS: 
We watched half of the one show, we started watching the 
first part of the second show. 
32. Id. a t  3 (statement of Gus Rose). 
33. Id.  (statement of Jackie Johnson). 
34. Id. a t  3 (statement of Gus Rose). 
35. Id. 
36. Id.  a t  42. This time sequence became crucial to corroborate Harris' testimony. 
The defense called the theatre managers, who testified that " 'The Student Body' ran 
from 7:00 p.m. until 8:25 p.m., 'The Swinging Cheerleaders' ran from 8:40 p.m. until 
10:14 p.m., and 'The Student Body' ran again from 10:24 p.m. until 11:49 p.m. (Trial R. 
111-614-15, 627)." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) a t  16 (Crim. Dist. 
Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). The prosecu- 
tor knew from his investigator's written report that " 'The Student Body' ended a t  11:45 
p.m. and there were no other showings that night." Id. a t  17. Nevertheless, the prosecu- 
tor not only suppressed this report about the movie times from the defense, but actually 
vigorously cross-examined the managers in an effort to suggest that they may have 
shown "Swinging Cheerleaders" a second time and that the theater may have remained 
open for another hour. Id. a t  16-17. 
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. . .  
I didn't really care for the second feature, which was an R- 
rated, cheerleader type thing. . . . 
. . . 
I told him I wanted to leave. 
. . . [Hle's acting kind of strange because he wanted to watch 
the end of the movie. Anyway, we left and we drove back towards 
Dallas, and we drove to the motel. 
. . . I told him that since he was looking for a job, and there 
hadn't been anybody there a t  work, that if he wanted to stop 
back Monday morning . . . he can ride out and follow me to work, 
dnd he can talk to the boss. And he would probably get a job. 
. . . I told him what time I went to work. And I left. 
. . . 
So I made me a sandwich and sat there and watched the end 
of The Carol Burnett Show. And when it went off, the news came 
on, and I watched fifteen, twenty minutes of the news. And that 
was it. I turned the TV off and went to sleep.37 
As Adams talks, the camera scans a page from the local TV list- 
ings for that date, showing that the Carol Burnett Show was on 
until 10 p.m., after which the evening news came on. 
The film shifts back to the interrogation of Adams. We see 
close up an old typewriter, a clock on the wall, a document enti- 
tled "Voluntary Statement," and an ashtray gradually filling 
with cigarette butts. The police take a typewritten statement 
from Adams. "I read through it, and when it was basically what 
I liked, yes, I signed it."38 
Police officers state that: 
[Alfter he made his right turn on Inwood Road . . . this is where 
our statement ends. He says he does not remember anything after 
that. 
He didn't remember anything about a shooting. He didn't re- 
member anything about a police officer stopping him or anything. 
. . . [Tlhat part of his mind just conveniently went blank. 
. . . And that's just a convenient memory lapse, is all that is.38 
A newspaper reports that Adams "confessed." 
Adams is now charged with capital murder and the case is 
37. Transcript, supra note 1, at 13-15. 
38. Id. at 15. 
39. Id. 
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scheduled for trial. Douglas Mulder will prosecute. The camera 
slowly scans a list of Mulder's victories, including the names of 
several defendants he sent to the electric chair. According to 
Edith James, one of Adams' attorneys: 
Douglas Mulder had a perfect win record. I believe he re- 
signed from the D.A.'s office without any defeats . . . . 
That's why he's legendary. 
Everything, as I recall, that Mulder ever said was about what 
a great guy Mulder was, how wonderful it was that he was getting 
all these convi~tions.'~ 
Judge Donald Metcalfe will preside. The camera closely 
peers into his face as he speaks: "I grew up in a family where I 
was taught a great respect for law enforcement. My father was 
an F.B.I. man probably at  the worst possible time to be in the 
F.B.I. It was from 1932 to 1935 in Chicago."'l 
Metcalfe is portrayed as a crime buff with evident sympathy 
toward law enforcement. We watch a clip from an old movie 
depicting John Dillinger's death, as Metcalfe recounts how his 
father was at  the Biograph Theater the night that Dillinger 
was apprehended. Metcalfe describes the public's fascination 
with Dillinger - "people were dipping their handkerchiefs 
in [Dillinger's] blood to get souvenirs" - and the "trivia" 
surrounding his capture - the "Woman in Red" that fingered 
Dillinger "was really the Lady in Orange."42 
Adams describes the testimony of Harris and Turko. Harris 
"was two hours late"43 in his account of the events that day. 
Adams stated: "Everything that we did coincide with, he was 
two hours late. . . . The police officer was killed at  twelve thirty, 
which is about two and a half hours after he last saw me."" Re- 
ferring to Harris, Adams states: 
His testimony is: as we were getting off the freeway on Inwood 
Avenue, that we're pulled over, he gets scared and he slumps 
down in the seat of the car. That as the officer walks up and 
shines his flashlight and I roll down my window, I pull the pistol 
40. Id. at 18. 
41. Id. at 21. 
42. Id. at 22. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 23. 
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out and blow this man away. 
His testimony is: that when I finally do drive to the motel, I 
get out. I tell him, "Don't worry about it. Forget this ever 
happened." 
Now, that's crazy. That's crazy.'& 
Turko, according to Adams, gave an inconsistent account. 
She told the police in her original statement, made fifteen min- 
utes after the killing, that the killer wore "a fur-lined ~ollar."'~ 
. . . In court: it might have been bushy hair. The kid [Harris] 
testified that I had a Levi jacket on . . . . He testified a t  pre-trial 
that he had a fur-lined parka. 
She's telling you who killed the man. One person in the car 
with the fur-lined collar. 
Very convenient that the driver happened to have bushy 
hair. All she's got to do is look a t  a picture they took of me. But 
that is not her original statement. It's a hell of a big difference 
from "a fur-lined collar" to "bushy hair."" 
Adams testified in his own behalf. His lawyers were "very 
optimistic" about the result. Returning to the courtroom after a 
recess, however, they saw three people standing in front of the 
bench taking the oath to be sworn as witnesse~.'~ A courtroom 
artist's sketch depicts the scene. These three last-minute wit- 
nesses were Emily Miller, her husband R.L. Miller, and Michael 
Randell.4g The most forceful witness was Emily Miller. 
Mrs. Miller got on the stand that last afternoon. And she 
said, "that's the man - I saw that man! I saw Randall Adams' 
face just right after. . . ." She said, "I saw the gun sticking out of 
the car when he shot that police officer, and that's the man," and 
she waved her finger right toward Randall Adams. She's the one 
that got him c o n ~ i c t e d . ~ ~  
The camera carefully surveys Emily Miller - dyed blond 
45. Id. at 22-23. 
46. Id. at 24. 
47. Id. at 24-25 (statement of Randall Adams). 
48. Id. at 25. 
49. These "rebuttal" witnesses were not included on the prosecutor's list of wit- 
nesses. Defense counsel did not learn of their existence until they testified. Ex parte 
Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 21 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), 
aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
50. Transcript, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Adams' attorney, Edith James). 
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hair, heavily made up, much older than  she looked in newspaper 
photographs taken during the trial. Her  free-flowing monologue 
has a stunning impact, contrasting sharply with the cramped 
question and  answer style of testimony. As she talks, the  film 
intermingles several clips from a n  old Boston Blackie movie: 
EMILY MILLER: 
Yeah, when I was a kid I used to want to be a detective all 
the time because I used to watch all the detective shows on TV. 
When I was a kid they used to show these movies with Bos- 
ton Blackie and he always had a woman with him. And I wanted 
to be the wife of a detective or be a detective, so I always watched 
detective stories. 
I'm always looking because I never know what might come 
up. Or how I could help. I like to help in situations like that. I 
really do. 
It's always happening to me, everywhere I go, you know, lots 
of times there's killings or anything, even around my house. 
Wherever. And I'm always looking or getting involved, you know, 
find out who did it, or what's going on. 
I listen to people. And I'm always trying to decide who's lying 
or who killed who before the police do. See if I can beat them. 
Yeah.61 
The camera deftly alternates between Emily Miller and her 
husband R.L. Miller as they describe what they claim they saw 
t h a t  night. 
EMILY MILLER: 
See, I was working at a gas station.62 My husband and I both. 
And then we weren't getting along well a t  all. So we was arguing 
back and forth. And this was why we didn't want to go home be- 
cause we would rather talk it out in the car than go home with 
the kids and fight, you know? Had to listen to them, too. So we 
were really arguing, and we decided to go get something to eat. 
So about that time, a police came out of a restaurant on the 
right hand side of the road and he went to pull the man over. 
R.L. MILLER: 
She turned around. I seen she was looking hard. She looked. 
And I didn't think she seen the guy, but she did. Because I said, 
51. Id.  at 26. 
52. In fact, as we later learn, Emily Miller was fired from her job two weeks earlier 
for stealing from her boss. 
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"What you looking at?" Because I knew something went wrong. I 
said, "What you looking at?" 
And she said, "You just shut up and drive." 
EMILY MILLER: 
And I kept telling my husband, "Slow down, slow down so I 
can see." And he said, "No." He said, "Come on." He said, 
"We're getting out of here. You're too nosy. You don't even know 
what's going on." 
R.L. MILLER: 
I had no idea somebody was going to get killed or shot. So I 
just drove on. 
EMILY MILLER: 
He was one of these kind that . . . he didn't like getting in- 
volved in nothing. He wanted to go on. He told me to shut up and 
turn around, don't look. I turned around and looked anyway. 
R.L. MILLER: 
So we heard something like backfire, or firecrackers, or some- 
thing. And so we drove over the bridge, and I got to thinking, I 
said, "Emily, there're no firecrackers this time of the year." 
I was thinking to myself, "that couldn't be somebody shoot- 
ing," you know. 
EMILY MILLER: 
I t  was real dark, and it was cold. I t  was hard to see in that 
car. But, see, his window was down. The driver's window was 
down. And this is how I got such a good look. 
R.L. MILLER: 
I really didn't see anything inside. I t  was kind o f .  . . shadows 
on the window and stuff. But when he rolled down the window 
was what made his face stand out so. . . . The car was dark blue. 
He had a beard, mustache, kind of dishwater-blond hair. But 
like I say, when he was in court, he sure looked a lot different. All 
I could tell was by this and this, you know, it was him. 
I knew that there was some shots over there. I mean, you 
know, but I didn't want to be involved in it, because West Dallas 
is a high-crime neighborhood. One of the biggest. 
EMILY MILLER: 
He was more scared of it than I was. But see, when you have 
black people like that, they don't like getting involved in nothing. 
That's just common. 
Like hearin', you know. . . ? Nobody wants to see nothing or 
hear nothing. And they'll stay completely in the background. 
That's why they were having such a hard time over there finding 
anybody that would come forward - because it was in a totally 
black neighborhood. 
Heinonline - -  9 Pace L. Rev. 289 1989 
290 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:275 
R.L. MILLER: 
She just believed if she seen somebody doing something 
wrong, she'd sure tell it. She told on me a couple of times. She 
said that I was hauling drugs out of El Paso. Called the Sheriff 
down there, going to make me open my trunk. So I ended up 
opening it, but there wasn't nothing in it. Yeah, and . . . [.] Oh, 
man! Eeeooowww. Yeah, if she found out you done something, she 
sure turn you in.6s 
With this lengthy dialogue as a backdrop, the film reveals 
information about the Millers that was not disclosed to defense 
counsel during the trial. The Millers apparently were engaged in 
a violent weekend-long argument and were arrested for disor- 
derly and violent behavior, a t  which point they decided to be- 
come prosecution witne~ses.~' Emily Miller admits that she 
53. Id. at  26-28. 
54. See Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  8. On December 3, 
1976, Emily Miller gave a statement to the police in which she described the driver as 
" 'either a Mexican or a very light skinned black man.' " Id. at  9. Adams is a white man. 
Prior to trial the court ordered the prosecutor to provide the defense with any informa- 
tion favorable to the defendant or inconsistent with the prosecution's theory of guilt. 
The prosecutor, according to the district court on Adams' application for a writ of 
habeas corpus, "knowingly suppressed Mrs. Miller's written statement." Id. "During de- 
liberations, the jury sent out a note asking for Mrs. Miller's initial description of the 
driver to the police. The trial court refused this request. (Trial R. V. - 1313-15)." Appli- 
cation for writ of Habeas Corpus Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) a t  
7-11. The prosecutor subsequently testified a t  a federal evidentiary hearing that he 
should have disclosed the statement to the defense but "forgot" to do so. See Adams v. 
Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G a t  8 (N.D. Tex. filed May 13, 1988). 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had initially ruled on this issue on the direct 
appeal. The court determined that defense counsel did not request Emily Miller's state- 
ment until three days after she testified. "This was not a timely request, and appellant 
may not complain of the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the statement earlier." 
Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently misread the record. A federal mag- 
istrate, after an evidentiary hearing, held 
that finding is clearly not supported by the record. . . . It is, thus, manifest from 
the state record that defense counsel made the proper motion for production of 
Miller's statement and that such motion was granted by the trial court. The con- 
trary finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals is not supported by the record and 
is not entitled to be presumed correct by this Court. 
Adams, Civ. No. CA. 3-85-24484 at  8. 
The district judge, ruling on Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus, made 
these additional findings: 
16. On Monday, May 2, 1977, defense counsel reiterated his request that the State 
produce any prior written statements made by Mrs. Miller. 
17. Mr. Mulder then provided Mrs. Miller's written statement. 
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viewed a line-up in which Adams was present. She identified 
someone other than Adams - "I didn't pick him out right 
then, because I picked out this bushy-haired mannss - after 
18. Applicant sought to reopen the testimony to recall Mrs. Miller for further 
cross-examination. 
19. Mr. Mulder advised the court that Mrs. Miller had already left for Bellville, 
Illinois, and that he had went to her apartment that morning and determined that 
she had moved out (Trial R. V-1147, 1150-51). 
20. In the alternative, applicant offered Mrs. Miller's written statement for im- 
peachment so the jury would have the benefit of her initial description (Trial R. 
V-1148, 1157-58). 
21. Mr. Mulder opposed the offer, contending that although it was not unfair to 
the State, it was unfair to Mrs. Miller to admit her written statement without 
giving her a chance to explain (Trial R. V-1160). 
22. The court excluded the statement, observing that if Mrs. Miller was still in 
Dallas, the court "absolutely" would allow applicant to recall her (Trial R. V- 
1166). 
23. In fact, Mrs. Miller was in Dallas a t  the Alamo Plaza Motel on Monday, May 
2, 1977. 
24. The Dallas County District Attorney's Office had been paying the Millers' ho- 
tel bill at  the Adolphus Hotel through Friday, April 29, 1977. 
25. When Mrs. Miller completed her testimony, she told Mr. Mulder that she 
would be at the Alamo Plaza Motel if he needed her any further (Fed. R. 1-125). 
26. Mr. Mulder's statement to the court that Mrs. Miller was en route to Bellville, 
Illinois, was incorrect. 
27. The State's knowledge that Mrs. Miller was at  the Alamo Plaza Motel was 
corroborated, to some extent, by the presence of her motel phone bill in the 
State's file, with notations made on that bill by Mr. Mulder. Mr. Mulder was una- 
ble to explain at  the evidentiary hearing why he had Mrs. Miller's bill from the 
Alamo Plaza Motel in his file and why he had made notations regarding the num- 
ber of phone calls made from her room. 
28. During deliberations, the jury sent out notes asking for Mrs. Miller's initial 
description of the driver to the police and inquiring whether Mrs: Miller had iden- 
tified applicant in a police lineup. 
29. The jury was extremely concerned about Mrs. Miller's identification testi- 
mony, but expressed no such concern with the less compelling testimony of Robert 
Miller and Michael Randell. 
30. This issue was properly preserved for review when the court granted, prior to 
trial, applicant's Gaskin and Brady motions. 
31. No appellate court has ever fully considered the merits of this issue. 
32. Suppression of this statement was harmful to applicant, as it could have been 
used to impeach Mrs. Miller's harmful testimony identifying him as the driver. 
33. The State's suppression of this statement undermines the court's confidence 
in the jury verdict. 
34. The court recommends that habeas corpus relief be granted. 
Ex parte Randall Dale Adarns, No. W-77-1286-I(B) a t  10-11. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals specifically affirmed these findings. Ex parte 
Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 at  9-12 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
55. Transcript, supra note 1, at 44. 
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which a police officer told her that Adams was the murder sus- 
p e ~ t . ~ ~  R.L. Miller viewed the same line-up and did not pick out 
Adams because "he didn't get that good a look at  him."67 The 
film discloses a very large reward offered in the Wood 
case - neatly portrayed by newspaper clippings - and sug- 
gests that this reward inspired the Millers to point out Adams. 
We learn also that Emily Miller's daughter was about to stand 
trial on armed robbery charges carrying a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment, but that one week after Emily Miller testified 
in the Adams case, the robbery charges against her daughter 
were dropped.58 
56. The district court found that "the State knowingly used perjured testimony. . . 
in eliciting [Emily Miller's] testimony that she had identified [Adams] in a police 
lineup." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  12-13. 
This finding was based upon the following: 
1. At trial, Emily Miller testified outside the presence of a jury that in December 
1976, she identified applicant in a police lineup (Trial R. IV-1080-81). 
2. In response to questions from the court, she testified that the police did not 
suggest which person in the lineup she should identify and that she identified 
applicant on her own (Trial R. IV-1088-89). 
3. The trial court found that her trial identification was not tainted by an unduly 
suggestive lineup (Trial R. IV-1097). 
4. During deliberations, the jury sent out notes inquiring whether Mrs. Miller had 
identified applicant in a police lineup (Trial R. V-1320-21). 
5. In fact, Mrs. Miller identified someone other than applicant in the police 
lineup. 
6. Mrs. Miller asked the officer conducting the lineup whether she had identified 
the "right man." 
7. The officer told Mrs. Miller that she had identified the "wrong man." 
8. Mrs. Miller asked the officer which person was the "right man." 
9. The officer pointed out applicant, by place in the lineup, as the murder suspect. 
. . . 
12. The State suppressed evidence that Mrs. Miller failed to identify applicant in 
a police lineup, after which an officer improperly advised her that applicant was 
the murder suspect. 
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) a t  11-12. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals specifically affirmed these findings. Ex parte 
Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 a t  11-12. 
57. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 a t  12. The prosecutor also suppressed 
information contained in his files that R.L. Miller failed to  pick Adams out of a line-up. 
Id. 
58. The dismissal of the robbery charges was initiated by Mulder, who advised his 
co-prosecutor a t  the Adams trial to "check out" the robbery case against Miller's daugh- 
ter. The case was dismissed the following day. The attorney representing Miller's daugh- 
ter was not even aware of the dismissal. The existence of the pending charges against 
Miller's daughter was never disclosed to the defense, even though the existence of such 
charges motivated the Millers to testify for the prosecution. Ex parte Randall Dale 
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The film portrays the Millers as self-motivated, irresponsi- 
ble, and corrupt witnesses, whose last-minute testimony was 
given too late to permit the defense attorneys to investigate 
their stories. Elba Carr, a fellow employee of the Millers at  Fas 
Gas, reinforces these impressions. Emily Miller, according to 
Carr, "had never told the truth in her life."69 
[R.L. Miller] came to work the day after. He got to telling me 
about the policeman that had gotten shot the night before. And I 
hadn't heard anything about it. And I thought'it was another one 
of these stories . . . And he brings in these newspapers, and he 
says: he didn't see a damn thing. He couldn't see nothing, it was 
too dark. 
Wheels started rolling in his head about money, you know. 
And that's when he got the idea . . . Let me put it in his 
words: for enough money, he would testify to what they wanted 
him to say. He would say anything that they wanted him to say. 
Or he would see anything that they wanted [him] to see. 
Those were his words. 
1 was shocked that he did go ahead and get up and tell that 
he saw the actual shooting and . . . you know, recognized the boy. 
Identified him.60 
Carr tried to alert the defense to these facts but was too late.61 
The third last-minute witness was Michael Randell. He tells 
us that he has "develop[ed] something like total recall."62 There 
were two individuals in the car, according to Randell, and the 
driver had long blond hair and a moustache. His recollection 
contradicts his claim to "total recall." 
The officer, he walked up to the vehicle. He had walked up. 
His car was . . . let me see . . . I don't know if it was behind or in 
front, but I know he had him pulled over, and he was up to the 
car. I think he was up to the car. Let me think. Yeah, he was up 
to the car. He had to have been up to the car. He was up to the 
car. 
I didn't see no bullet. I didn't see no gunfire. Because I went 
Adorns, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 13-15. 
59. Transcript, supra note 1, at 29. 
60. Id. at 29-30 (statement of Elba Carr). 
61. The film reproduces close up the contemporaneous telephone messages from Ms. 
Carr to the defense attorneys reporting that the Millers were "telling lies." 
62. Transcript, supra note 1, at 30. 
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Randell testified that on the night of the offense he had 
been playing basketball a t  a nearby local court until midnight, 
and that he was alone in his car. These statements, Randell ad- 
mits, were untrue. In fact, the local basketball court closed a t  5 
p.m., and Randell had been cheating on his wife with a woman 
named Debbie at  the "Plush Pub" in Fort Worth.64 Debbie was 
with him in the car at the time.66 Randell is much more candid 
on camera than he was in his sworn testimony a t  the trial. 
I didn't tell them about that. I couldn't tell them. My wife'd kill 
me. My wife would've tore my head off if she'd knowed I was out 
that night with another woman. . . . I was trying to get her home. 
The driver's side was down because the lady was a little sick. 
You see, she needed some air, because she was pretty drunk." 
Closing arguments by the defense and prosecution conclude 
the trial. Mulder's summation, Judge Metcalfe recalls, was 
highly emotional: 
I always try very hard - every judge I know of does - to 
not show emotion on the bench. The reason: if you do show emo- 
tion, the jury might take it  that you're favoring one side or an- 
other. So you try to remain passive, emotionless, objective. 
I do have to admit that in the Adams case - and I've never 
really said this before - Doug Mulder's final argument was one 
I'd never heard before: about the "thin blue line" of police that 
separates the public from anarchy. And I have to concede that my 
eyes kind of welled up when I heard that. It did get to me emo- 
tionally, but I don't think I showed it.67 
We are slapped with the newspaper headline: "Adams Guilty." 
The film shifts to the punishment phase of the trial. In 
Texas, the jury decides whether a defendant convicted of capital 
63. Id. at 31 (statement of Michael Randell). 
64. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 15 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 
Dallas County), aff 'd ,  No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
65. Randell testified at trial that he formerly played professional basketball with the 
Denver Rockets, that on the night of the offense he had been playing basketball at a 
nearby local court until midnight, and that he was alone in his car. This testimony, ac- 
cording to the district judge, was perjurious. Id. at 15-16. 
66. Transcript, supra note 1, at 42. 
67. Id.  at 31. 
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murder should be executed. The jury's decision depends on 
whether it finds that the defendant presents a future danger to 
society." TO help the jury answer this question, the prosecutor 
routinely elicits psychiatric testimony about the defendant's po- 
tential dangerousness. One of the most controversial of these 
psychiatric witnesses is Dr. James P. Grigson, known as "Dr. 
Doom" or "Dr. Death."69 
ADAMS: 
It was April 15th' tax day. I think I was filling out my taxes 
at the time. Afraid I might be late. A guard walks up to the door 
and tells me there's someone out here who wants to talk to you. I 
asked him who it was. He said, he didn't know, but the court or- 
dered me to talk to him. I said, "Oh, all right." 
68. T E X .  CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1989). T h e  statute provides: 
(a )  Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty o f  a capital offense, the  court shall 
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding t o  determine whether the  defendant 
shall be sentenced t o  death or life imprisonment. T h e  proceeding shall be  con- 
ducted in  the  trial court before the  trial jury as soon as practicable. In the pro- 
ceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that  t h e  court deems rele- 
vant t o  sentence. T h i s  subsection shall not be  construed to authorize the 
introduction o f  any evidence secured in violation o f  the Constitution o f  t h e  United 
States or o f  the  State o f  Texas. T h e  state and the  defendant or his counsel shall 
be permitted t o  present argument for or against sentence o f  death. 
( b )  On  conclusion o f  the  presentation o f  the  evidence, the court shall submit the  
following . . . issues t o  the jury: 
( 1 )  whether the conduct o f  the  defendant that caused the  death o f  t h e  deceased 
was committed deliberately and with the  reasonable expectation that  t h e  death o f  
the  deceased or another would result; 
( 2 )  whether there is a probability that  the defendant would commit criminal acts 
o f  violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. . . . 
69. Dr. Grigson's testimony i n  capital murder trials has attracted considerable at- 
tention. He has been labeled "Dr. Death." West Fifty Seventh Street (CBS television 
broadcast, Oct. 15, 1988); Cope, Predicting Future Violence, TRIAL 82 (Feb. 1982) ("He's 
the killer shrink") (quoting Henry Schwartzchild, Director o f  the  Capital Punishment 
Project o f  the American Civil Liberties Union); Merton, Confidentiality and the  "Dan- 
gerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 
263, 287 (1982) ("Dr. Grigson apparently has yet to meet a defendant he does not think 
dangerous' "); T h e  New Yorker, Sept. 5 ,  1988 at 76. He also has been referred t o  as "Dr. 
Doom." Pike, "Doctor of Doom" Testimony Rejected: Death Sentence Vacated i n  
Texas," NAT'L L.J. June 1, 1981, a t  5 ,  col. 2; Tybor,  Dallas Doctor of Doom, NAT'L L.J., 
Nov. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 2. He has been called the  "hanging psychiatrist." J. WINSCADE 
AND J. ROSS, THE INSANITY PLEA 167 (1983). Dr. Grigson's testimony also has been the 
subject o f  three Supreme Court decisions: Satterwhite v. Texas,  108 S. Ct .  1792 (1988); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Estelle v. Smith,  451 U.S. 454 (1981). See  Davis, 
Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures: T h e  Role of the Jury  and the  Restraining Hand 
o f  the Expert,  69 J. CR. L. & CRIM. 300 (1978). 
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And here come this real tall, ostrich-looking dude. [A photo- 
graph depicts a smiling Grigson sprawled out on a sofa]. 
He introduced himself as Dr. Grigson. He pulled a pad out of 
his coat pocket that had a line drawn across it. On this pad, on 
the upper half he had six images. I will say a box, a square, a 
circle with a diamond in it. I don't know - you know, it's been 
awhile. He slides this piece of paper across to me and he hands 
me a pencil. He says, "I'm going to get a cup of coffee. Please 
copy what's on this piece of paper." 
Well, I'm looking a t  this man, I said, "What? You want it 
copied just the same way you did? Or you want me to change it 
around? What do you want me to do?" He said, "[Jlust do 
whatever you think you want to do," and he left. So on the bot- 
tom half of this piece of paper I made my boxes and x's and zeros 
with diamonds in them exactly like his. [A photograph of a 
Bender-Gestalt test flashes on the screen]. 
He asked me, "What's the meaning of a rolling stone gathers 
no moss?" I'm looking a t  this man and I'm saying, "Are you kid- 
ding, is this a joke? What are you doing?" He said, "No, I really 
want to know your answer to that question." I said, "Well, a roll- 
ing stone gathers no moss, to me it would represent a person that 
doesn't stand still long enough. It's kind of hard for people to 
cling to him, he keeps moving on. It's hard for people to get close 
to him." 
He shook his head. He said, "What about, a bird in the hand 
is worth two in the bush?" I said, "If you have a hold of some- 
thing why give it up for the chance of getting something that 
might be a little better? I t  doesn't make sense. You have got 
something pretty good why let go of it? If you can get the other 
one, get i t  if you can, but don't let go of what you got to try to get 
something else.["] 
He asked about my family. He asked about my background, 
and he left. Total time we had talked: maybe fifteen, twenty 
minutes.'O 
We are hit with another newspaper headline: "No remorse 
. . . no guilt." 
Adams recalls Grigson's characterizations: 
He called me Charlie Manson. He called me Adolf Hitler. He 
said I'm the type of personality that can work all day and creep 
all night. 
70. Transcript, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
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. . . Even though he talked to me for fifteen minutes. I have 
no prior . . . arrest[s]. . . . 
He's crazy. He's c ra~y.~ '  
Judge Metcalfe remarks: 
You can understand why a man might steal if he needs 
money to . . . put food on the table. I can understand why a sev- 
enteen year old boy who doesn't have a car would steal one to 
ride around in. I can understand why the heroin addict needs her- 
oin. But it's very hard to understand why anybody has to kill a 
police officer. It just doesn't have to beJ2 
A newspaper headline seals the  result: "Adams Given Death." 
Adams reflects on his death sentence as the film scans a 
stark black and white photograph of an  electric chair: 
They're very serious. They're talking about how they're going 
to execute you. Plain and simple. We're going to end it right here. 
You get numb. You get numb. You get . . . [ilt's like a bad dream. 
You want to wake up but you can't do it. 
Fifteen times, twenty times a day I hear this same story 
about what happens when a man is electrocuted. His eyeballs pop 
out. His fingernails pop out. His toenails pop out. He bleeds out 
of every orifice he's got.73 
Harris, in turn, reflects on Adams' fate: "I didn't have any 
idea of what happened to him. After I testified, I was gone. 
I never really concerned myself with it, you [klnow. Maybe I 
didn't want to  know. I didn't have any interest in knowing, oth- 
erwise I might have tried to find out."74 
The post-trial proceedings are quickly condensed. Adams 
lost his appeal in the Texas Court of Criminal  appeal^.'^ One 
week before his execution, the United States Supreme Court 
granted him a stay, and a year later vacated his death 
~ e n t e n c e . ~ ~  
71. Id. at 34. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 35. 
74. Id. at 36. 
75. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
76. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1980). The Supreme Court held that the 
Texas statute in effect at Adams' trial relating to the qualifications of persons to serve on 
capital juries violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments as construed in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court in Adams found that under the 
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Judge Metcalfe's view of the appellate process suggests ei- 
ther  naivete or arrogance: 
Our highest state appellate court - the Court of Criminal 
Appeals in Austin - affirmed the case 9-0. And then it was re- 
versed by the United States Supreme Court, 8-1. 
When the Appellate Court reverses a case, they are never 
saying the trial judge was right or wrong. They are saying they 
disagree with the judge. You can't, for instance, in the Adams ap- 
peals say the appellate courts were saying I was right or I was 
wrong. 
After all if in Austin, in our state appeals court, I was 9-0 
correct and in Washington I was 1-8 incorrect. If you tally all 
those votes I come out 10-8.77 
Adams sought a new trial bu t  his request was suspiciously 
rejected. T h e  prosecutor's office, according t o  Adams' lawyer, 
vowed a retrial of Randall Dale Adams because there was no 
room . . . for a cop-killer going free, or getting off with anything 
less than the death penalty. . . . 
. . . For reasons that were never really made public, [the pros- 
ecutor] requested the governor to commute Mr. Adams' death 
penalty to life and that eliminated the possibility of a retrial 
based on the reversal.?' 
Texas statute, a prospective juror automatically was excluded from service if that juror 
was unwilling to swear that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would 
not affect his or her deliberations on any factual issue. Such inquiry resulting in exclu- 
sion from service was much broader than Witherspoon permitted. Adorns, 448 U.S. at 
50-51. The appropriate standard is not whether the juror might in any way be affected 
by the imposition of the death penalty, but rather, whether the juror would be unable to 
follow the judge's instructions or obey his or her oath as juror. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 
522. 
77. Transcript, supra note 1, at  38-39. 
78. Id. at  39. See Adams v. State, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) wherein 
the court, by a vote of 6-3, denied Adams' application for a new trial following the Su- 
preme Court's decision setting aside his death sentence. The majority's brief opinion 
held that the Supreme Court decision had no direct effect on the as yet unaltered judg- 
ment of guilt against Adams found in the trial court. Id.  a t  569. Moreover, the majority 
concluded, since the Governor commuted the death penalty, there was no judgment re- 
maining upon which the state court could act. Id.  Three judges vigorously dissented, 
urging that the Governor's action constituted a usurpation by the executive branch of 
the judiciary's constitutional power. Id. at  569-70 (Clinton, J., dissenting). The dissenters 
pointed out that on the date the Governor commuted the death sentence, in view of the 
Supreme Court's decision, there was no valid judgment in existence assessing the punish- 
ment at  death, and therefore nothing for the Governor to commute. Id.  at 570. The dis- 
sent implied that the commutation was a sham to prevent Adams from obtaining a new 
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The film ends by focusing once more on David Harris. Al- 
though Sam Kittrell could not recall any specific factor in 
Harris' background that would suggest violent or pathological 
behavior, he mentions, almost in passing, that David "had one 
brother that drowned, numerous years ago."79 We are suddenly 
hit with the realization that this event is a clue to unraveling the 
mystery. As Harris speaks, we see family album photographs of 
Harris, his father and mother, and his younger brother. The ef- 
fect is poignant, suggesting the seeds of Harris' criminal 
personality. 
I was three years old - I had a four year old brother and he 
drowned, in 1963, right after President Kennedy was assassi- 
nated, I believe - sometime right after that during the summer. 
We was living in Beaumont on Harrison Street and, my dad was 
working on his truck out in the yard and mom was in the house 
doing her housework or fixing dinner or something. 
Me and my brother, we had one of these blow up pools and 
we were playing in that. My dad was supposed to be watching us 
or keeping eyes on us or something. My brother wandered off, 
down the street, and these people had a swimming pool in their 
backyard, and they were elderly people, and they never used the 
pool. I guess it  had a bunch of leaves and stuff in it. And he, 
evidently, fell in there and drowned. 
I guess that was a great loss for me. I used to sit up in my 
room at  night and talk to him and he wasn't even there. So I 
guess that might have been some kind of a traumatic experience 
for me, you [klnow, a t  that time - not really understanding 
what it was but having that loss. 
I guess my dad always kind of felt responsible because, he 
was supposed to have been there watching us. And I don't know, 
maybe he couldn't get rid of the responsibility or the guilt or 
something. 
I don't know what it was. But I was there and I guess maybe 
I reminded him of that. All the time growing up it was hard for 
me to get any acceptance from him with anything I did. It was 
never good enough. And when my brother, my younger brother, 
trial. Id. at 569-70. The Executive Order stated that the Governor's commutation was at 
the request of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Id. at 570. But as the dissent 
noted, Adams never requested a commutation of his sentence or a pardon. Adams 
wanted a new trial. Id.  at 570 n.6. 
79. Transcript, supra note 1, at 47. 
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was born it was kind of like he was daddy's favorite. Or some- 
thing. I don't know. He realizes i t  now - how he treated me 
then and I know he regrets it. And he thinks maybe that that's 
what caused everything, but, I can't let him take that blame be- 
cause everybody's life is going to take some kind of path regard- 
less of what happens. 
I think maybe a lot of the things I did when I was younger 
was an attempt to get back a t  him or something for the way he 
treated me. But I came to realize I wasn't doing nothing but hurt- 
ing myself.80 
The film concludes with "the last interview" of David 
Harris, on December 5, 1986. We do not see Harris. We see a 
tape recorder in motion upon which is superimposed a transcript 
of that last interview: 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Would you say that Adams is a pretty unlucky fellow? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
Definitely. If it wasn't for bad luck, he wouldn't have had 
none. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
What was the bad luck? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
Could have been any number of things. Depends on how you 
want to look a t  it. It's like I told you a while ago about the guy 
who didn't have no place to stay. If he had a place to stay, he'd 
never have nowhere to go, right? 
ERROL MORRIS: 
You mean if he would have stayed there a t  the motel that 
night this would never have happened? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
Good possibility. Good possibility. Heard of the proverbial 
scapegoat? There's probably been thousands of innocent people 
convicted and there will probably be thousands more. Why? Who 
knows. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Is he innocent? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
Did you ask him? 
ERROL MORRIS: 
80. Id. at 48-49 (statement of David Harris). 
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Well, he's always said he's been innocent. 
DAVID HARRIS: 
There you go. Didn't believe him, huh? Criminals always lie. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Well, what do you think about whether or not he's innocent? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
I'm sure he is. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
How can you be sure? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
Because I'm the one that knows. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Were you surprised that the police blamed him? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
They didn't blame him. I did. A scared sixteen year old kid. 
He sure would like to get out of it  if he can. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Do you think they believed you? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
No doubt. Must have. They didn't have nothing else until I 
give them something, so . . . I guess they get something, they run 
with it, you know. 
ERROL MORRIS: 
Were you surprised they believed you? 
DAVID HARRIS: 
I might have been. I don't know. I was hoping they'd believe 
me. After all was said and done it was kind of unbelievable. But 
there it is. I've always thought if you could say why there's a rea- 
son that Randall Adams is in jail, it might be because the fact 
that he didn't have no place for somebody to stay that helped 
him that night . . . landed him where he's a t  . . . . 
That might be the reason. That might be the only, total rea- 
son why he's where he's a t  today.'' 
A close up of the red flashing police car light signals the 
film's end.82 
81. Id.  at 49-50. 
82. After The Thin Blue Line was produced, Harris made further and even more 
incriminating admissions. The district court found: 
10. Harris admitted to Steve Dunleavy of the FOX Television Network, David 
Pasztor of the Dallas Times Herald and David' Jackson of the Dallas Morning 
News that he was alone in the car at the time of the Wood murder, that he was 
holding the murder weapon in his right hand, that he stuck the gun outside the 
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11. The Prosecutor's Control Over the Adversarial System 
and the "Search for Truth" 
By providing a devastating account of an almost certain 
miscarriage of justice, The Thin Blue Line offers an enormously 
compelling critique of the utility and fairness of the adversary 
trial process. The problem is not unfamiliar. Many of the con- 
cerns about the legal fact-finding system have been raised in 
other contexts,83 but never in such a clear and direct way. To be 
sure, some limitations upon accurate fact-finding derive from 
constitutional and evidentiary rules.84 But the greatest threat to 
reliable fact-finding emanates from the prosecutor's unique and 
decisive role in the adversary system, and his ability to control 
the adjudication process. Indeed, the most serious malfunctions 
of the fact-finding process in Aclams were attributable to the 
prosecutor's willful suppression of evidence. 
The prosecutor is commonly regarded as the most dominant 
figure in the criminal justice system.86 The prosecutor decides 
driver's window as Officer Wood approached, that his finger was on the trigger, 
that the gun discharged five times, that Officer Wood fell to the ground and that 
Harris drove away. 
11. Harris sent a confidential letter to his mother in September 1988 acknowledg- 
ing that he, rather than applicant, was responsible for the Wood murder and ex- 
plaining reasons that he had not accepted responsibility when interrogated by the 
police in 1976. 
12. David Harris judicially confessed at  the habeas corpus hearing that he, rather 
than applicant, killed Officer Wood. 
13. The only time that Harris has denied killing Officer Wood was when the police 
confronted him with his admissions to friends and his possession of the murder 
weapon, at  which time he shifted the blame to applicant and later repeated that 
version at  trial. 
Ex parte Randall Dale Adarns, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  2 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas 
County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
83. See supra note 5. 
84. The exclusionary rules of the fourth and fifth amendments often keep out relia- 
ble proof. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); Jackson v. Denno, 378 
U.S. 368 (1964) (fifth amendment). Rules of privilege also deny proof to the fact-finder. 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (privilege against self-incrimination); Trammel 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (spousal privilege). 
85. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1555 (1981) (prosecutor holds the power to invoke or deny punishment); Young v. United 
States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987) ("Between the private life 
of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That 
state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any 
given individual.") See also B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 5 4.1 (1985). 
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whether or not to bring criminal charges, who to charge, what 
charges to bring, and whether a defendant will stand trial, plead 
guilty, or be granted immunity from prosecution. In jurisdictions 
that authorize capital punishment, the prosecutor literally de- 
cides who shall live and who shall die.86 Why did the prosecutor 
proceed against Randall Adams at  all? And with such vigor? 
Why did the prosecutor not proceed against David Harris, who 
more probably committed the murder? 
The prosecutor knew from the outset that the killer more 
closely resembled Harris than Adarn~ ,~?  that the car had been 
stolen by Harris,88 that the murder weapon had been stolen by 
Harris, and that Harris was on juvenile probation when Wood 
stopped the car.89 If he were caught with a stolen car or a 
weapon, Harris would have been returned to prison as a proba- 
tion violator. Harris went into hiding after the killing, thereafter 
returning to Vidor and committing additional violent crimes. 
Harris bragged to friends immediately after the killing that he 
had murdered The theater manager contradicted 
Harris' account of the time when Harris left the movies that 
night.O1 The three last-minute identification witnesses either 
failed to identify Adams in a line-up, gave inaccurate descrip- 
tions to the police, lied about their backgrounds, or had motives 
to fabricate their stories.92 By contrast, the prosecutor knew that 
86. Moreover, in exercising this vast power, the prosecutor is independent from the 
judiciary, and his discretion is virtually unlimited. The prosecutor can neither be com- 
pelled to prosecute, see United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. 
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973), nor can he be enjoined from prosecuting, 
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 411-13 (1920). Although some prosecutorial 
discretion is necessary, the exercise of such discretion can be "lawless," H. PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290 (1963); "tyrannical," see Henderson v. United 
States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting), and "dangerous," 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J .  CR. L. & CRIM. 3, 5 (1940). 
87. Turko's initial description, although vague, stated that the driver wore a "dark 
coat with a large collar" and had "collar length hair." Exhibit A-1, Ex parte Randall 
Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) (Crim. Dist. No. 2 Dallas County), aff 'd ,  No. 70,787 
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). She did not say until the trial that the driver had 
"bushy hair." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  6. 
88. Transcript. supra note 1, at  35. 
89. Id. at  19. 
90. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra note 36. 
92. See supra notes 54-56. 
Heinonline - -  9 Pace L. Rev. 303 1989 
304 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:275 
Adams had no criminal record, had been honorably discharged 
from the Army, had always held a steady job, had gone to work 
every day at his job in Dallas even after Wood was killed, had no 
history to even remotely suggest he would commit such a crime, 
and had no reason to kill the p o l i ~ e m a n . ~ ~  
Yet, Adams was an easy target. Harris provided eyewitness 
testimony,@' the Millers and Randell supplied corrob~rat ion,~~ 
and Adams himself made a statement which, although ambigu- 
ous, could have suggested that he knew more than he was say- 
ing.90 Admittedly, even an ethical prosecutor faces considerable 
pressure to proceed aggressively against a suspect such as 
Adams. Once a case acquires this kind of momentum, it becomes 
difficult - perhaps even institutionally impossible - for any 
prosecutor to analyze that case objectively and decide to forego 
or defer p rosecu t i~n .~~  Such institutional pressures are even 
more compelling in an unsolved murder of a police officer, and 
raise complex ethical and legal questions. Thus, although a pros- 
ecutor is obligated to ensure generally that justice is served, and 
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, he is also en- 
couraged to win.98 The pressures that impel a prosecutor to 
prosecute aggressively and make winning so attractive can result 
in conduct that violates a defendant's rights. 
The effectiveness and fairness of the adversary system pre- 
suppose that prosecutors behave fairly. The prosecutor is re- 
93. Exhibit F, Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex parte Randall Dale 
Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) (interoffice memorandum from Investigator Jeff Shaw to 
Assistant District Attorney Douglas Mulder). See also Transcript, supra note 1, at  34. 
94. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
97. See Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 552 
(1987). "At a crucial point in every investigation, therefore, the information gathering 
shifts from an impartial inquiry as to who did it to the building of a case against a 
specific person. What results is a natural tendency to acquire all the evidence that incul- 
pates the person selected as guilty while all other evidence is ignored." Id. 
98. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor's "interest . . . in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He 
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at  liberty to strike foul ones. I t  is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one."). See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-l.l(c) (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS- 
TICE] ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). 
Heinonline - -  9 Pace L. Rev. 304 1989 
19891 THIN BLUE LINE 305 
quired, among other things, to reveal information that tends to 
exculpate a defendant,ee not to offer any evidence that the pros- 
ecutor believes is f r a u d ~ l e n t , ' ~ ~  to refrain from advocacy that 
distorts the evidence,'O1 and to refrain from improper argument 
that encourages the jury to decide a case on matters unrelated to 
the evidence.lo2 In this case, these legal and ethical constraints 
on the prosecutor's behavior were ignored. 
Emily Miller, her husband, and Michael Randell were called 
by the prosecutor a t  the end of the trial as "rebuttal witnesses," 
preventing the defense from having any chance to investigate 
and contradict their stories. The strategy worked. Probably the 
most powerful testimony a t  the trial came from Emily Miller, 
waving her finger a t  Randall Adams and shouting, "that's the 
man - I saw that man!"'03 The prejudicial impact of such tes- 
timony on a jury is in~alculable. '~~ The jury during deliberations 
focused heavily on Miller's identification, wanting to know 
whether she gave a description to the police, and whether she 
picked Adams out of a line-up.l0" 
Too late for use a t  trial, the defense subsequently learned 
that both Millers had reputations as liars, would do anything for 
money, and were under arrest for other crimes a t  the time they 
offered cooperation to the prosecutor. The jury was given the 
false impression, apparently with the prosecutor's knowledge, 
99. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). See STANDARDS POR CRIMINAL JUS- 
TICE, supra note 98, at  $ 3-3.11(a) ("It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor inten- 
tionally to fail to make disclosure to the defense, a t  the earliest feasible opportunity, of 
the existence of evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused"). 
100. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). See STANDARDS POR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. 
supra note 98, at  $ 3-5.6 ("It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to 
offer false evidence. . ."). 
101. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 736 (1969). See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS- 
TICE, supra note 98, at  $$ 3-5.6, 3-5.7 (unprofessional conduct for prosecutor to offer 
inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, discredit a witness the prose- 
cutor knows is telling the truth, or ask questions that imply facts prosecutor knows are 
false). 
102. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1943). See STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 98, a t  $ 3.5-8 (prosecutor should not use arguments calcu- 
lated to inflame or mislead jury). 
103. Transcript, supra note 1, a t  25. 
104. F. Lowus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979). "[Tlhere is almost nothing more 
convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger a t  the defend- 
ant, and says, 'That's the one!' " Id. 
105. See supra notes 53-54. 
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that the Millers were gainfully employed and a t  work a t  the 
time they made their critical observations. Also unknown to the 
defense, but known to the prosecutor, was the Millers' interest 
in reward money for information about the killing, as well as the 
pendency of serious criminal charges against Emily Miller's 
daughter, charges which the prosecutor dismissed in the same 
courtroom one week after the Millers testified against Adams.lo6 
The context in which their claimed observations were 
made - in the space of a few seconds late a t  night on a dark 
street while driving in the opposite direction - by itself raises 
considerable doubt about the accuracy of the Millers' identifica- 
tions.lo7 The impeaching information, had it been known to the 
defense, would have destroyed their credibility. 
Moreover, the prosecutor plainly knew that the Millers were 
untrustworthy and impeachable witnesses, but did not reveal 
any of this information to the defense. The prosecutor, for ex- 
ample, withheld a statement Emily Miller gave to the police 
shortly after the killing, in which she described the killer as a 
"Mexican or light skinned black man."lo8 When the defense 
learned about this statement for the first time on Monday morn- 
ing following the Millers' Friday afternoon testimony, i t  sought 
to recall Mrs. Miller. The prosecutor objected, arguing that 
Miller had left Dallas and that the prosecutor did not know her 
present where about^.'^^ The prosecutor's files, however, con- 
tained receipts for numerous telephone calls made by the 
Millers that Monday from a different hotel in Dallas.ll0 The 
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
107. Courts and commentators have long recognized the treacherous nature of eye- 
witness proof, and the potential breakdown in the adversary process resulting from mis- 
taken identifications. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) "The vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with in- 
stances of mistaken identification." Id. at  228. Eyewitness identification is felt to be "in- 
herently suspect" and "notoriously unreliable." Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
A recent study of wrongful convictions concludes that the eyewitness misidentifica- 
tion is the single most important factor leading to conviction. See Huff, Rattner & 
Sagarin, Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 518, 524 (1986). 
108. See supra note 54. 
109. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also supra 
note 53. 
110. See supra note 53. 
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prosecutor similarly knew, but did not disclose to the defense, 
that neither Emily nor R. L. Miller was able to identify Adams 
from a line-up, and identified him only after a police investiga- 
tor pointed Adams out.l1' In view of the devastating impact of 
the Millers' in-court identifications, the prosecutor's suppression 
of this information and his tacit vouching for the accuracy of 
their testimony is astonishing, particularly when the defendant's 
life hung on the acceptance of that testimony. 
Distortion of proof is unethical and constitutes miscon- 
duct.l12 Yet, the prosecutor skewed his presentation of the proof 
to confuse the jury's perception of the facts. Although the prose- 
cutor knew, for example, that the drive-in movie closed well 
before midnight, which contradicted a crucial piece of Harris' 
testimony, the prosecutor cross-examined the theater manager 
in a deliberate effort to convey to the jury the false impression 
that the theater may have remained open past midnight.llg The 
prosecutor knew that Michael Randell gave false and misleading 
testimony about his background, where he was coming from, and 
who he was with.l14 The prosecutor knew that Turko had been 
hypnotized, and had made statements shortly after the shooting 
directly contradicting her trial testimony.l16 None of this infor- 
mation, clearly relevant to discredit the trustworthiness of these 
witnesses' accounts, was disclosed to the defense. Presupposing 
highly skilled defense counsel able to test the accuracy and 
truthfulness of the prosecution's proof - a basic postulate for 
the adversary system's success116 - the process necessarily 
malfunctions when the prosecutor is able to distort the informa- 
tion that enters the process, and screen out information that is 
detrimental to his case. 
111. See supra note 54. 
112. See supra note 100. 
113. See supra note 36. 
114. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
1.15. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
116. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
228, 228 (1964) ("The plea for the adversary system is that it elicits a reasonable approx- 
imation of the truth. The reasoning is that with each side on its mettle to present its own 
case and to challenge its opponents, the relevant unprivileged evidence in the main 
emerges in the ensuing clash."); Jonakait, supra note 97, at  566 ("When the prosecutor 
presents distorted or incomplete evidence and the defense is unaware of the deficient 
presentation, the adversary system is not fully functioning."). 
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The prosecutor also withheld important evidence about 
David Harris' credibility. Prosecutors commonly bargain with 
accomplices and informants to convict other criminals. Although 
these arrangements can be criticized on legal, policy, and ethical 
grounds,l17 the focus here is not on whether such practice in the 
abstract is good or bad. The focus, rather, is on the ability of the 
adversary system effectively to cope with this type of proof, es- 
pecially when a prosecutor conceals crucial information about 
the details of the arrangement. Harris indisputably received to- 
tal and complete immunity for his testimony against Adams. 
Harris, however, denied a t  trial that any deal had been made 
with the prosecutor. Harris now acknowledges that the prosecu- 
tor told him to deny that any deal was made if he were asked."* 
He admits that there was an understanding with the prosecutor 
that if he testified consistently with what the prosecutor wanted 
him to say, he would receive complete immunity for the many 
charges he faced, which carried sentences of up to life imprison- 
117. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (noting proclivity of accomplices 
to lie in favor of prosecution). See Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea 
Agreements, 72 CORNELL . REV. 800 (1987). See also Use of Jailhouse Informers Re- 
viewed in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1989, at  A14, col 1. 
118. The district court found: 
1.At trial, David Harris testified outside the presence of the jury that he had no 
deals, agreements, promises, or offers of leniency in exchange for his testimony 
(Trial R. IV-1114-16) nor would he get any help on the offenses committed in 
Vidor either before or after the Wood murder (Trial R. IV-1119). 
2.The burglary and aggravated robbery charges were not prosecuted and Harris' 
juvenile probation was not revoked after he testified against applicant. In fact, 
after applicant's trial, Harris never again had to report to his probation officer. 
3.0n the basis of conversations with the Dallas authorities, officer Sam Kittrell of 
the Vidor Police Department had the understanding, prior to applicant's trial, 
that Harris' charges would be dismissed after he testified against applicant. 
4.Harris' family retained a lawyer, Rodney Price, to determine whether Harris 
needed representation on the Vidor charges. After speaking to the authorities, 
Price advised the family prior to applicant's trial that Harris did not need counsel 
because the charges would not be prosecuted. 
5.The charges were dismissed in consideration for Harris' testimony against 
applicant. 
6.The court cannot conclude definitively that the State made a deal with Harris in 
exchange for his testimony against applicant. However, it does appear that Harris 
lied when he testified a t  trial that he would not get any help on the Vidor charges. 
7.The court cannot conclude definitively that the prosecutor had actual knowledge 
that Harris' charges would be dismissed at  the time Harris testified. 
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  4-5 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas 
County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
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ment.l19 As every prosecutor and defense lawyer knows, accurate 
testimony about this type of immunity bargain is crucial to a 
fact-finder's evaluation of a witness' credibility.120 A witness who 
points the finger at  someone else to protect his own life or free- 
dom is arguably less believable for that reason. The Adams jury 
never knew that Harris would go free in return for his testi- 
mony, and would have been imprisoned, perhaps for the rest of 
his life, if he did not testify against Adams in accordance with 
the deal. 
Compounding his misconduct, the prosecutor also resisted 
defense efforts to elicit proof that Harris committed several ad- 
ditional violent felonies after he returned to Vidor, which car- 
ried a penalty of life imprisonment. The prosecutor argued that 
such proof was irrelevant.121 Judge Metcalfe concurred, and ex- 
cluded this proof. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld 
Metcalfe's ruling. Nevertheless, a federal magistrate and a dis- 
trict judge subsequently ruled that the prosecutor, Metcalfe, and 
the Texas appeals court were wrong in keeping out that pr00f . l~~ 
Indeed, in a landmark case that was specifically cited to Judge 
Metcalfe, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the admissibil- 
ity of such pr00f . l~~ Had the jury known the extent of Harris' 
crimes and the extent of his self-interest in giving his testimony, 
the jury might very well have discounted his testimony entirely. 
Finally, the prosecutor's manipulation of "expert" testi- 
mony produced the death sentence. Although the jury nominally 
made the decision to execute Adams, the prosecutor and his psy- 
chiatric witnesses, particularly Dr. Grigson, actually were re- 
~ponsib1e.l~~ As Justice Blackmun wrote in one of several cases 
reaching the Supreme Court involving the testimony of the 
"ubiqui to~s" '~~ Dr. Grigson: "In a capital case, the specious tes- 
119. Transcript, supra note 1, at 43. See also Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 
W-77-1286-I(B) at 4-5. 
120. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) ("[tlhe exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally pro- 
tected right of cross-examination"). 
121. Transcript, supra note 1, at 21. 
122. Adams v. Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G at 6 (N.D. Tex. filed May 13, 
1988); Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B), at 4. 
123. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 309. 
124. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
125. Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1803 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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timony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable 
jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's 
words, equates with death itself."126 
Dr. Grigson examined Adams for about fifteen minutes.12' 
Dr. Grigson testified that Adams had the profile and characteris- 
tics of a sociopath and would commit criminal acts of violence in 
the future that would constitute a continuing threat to soci- 
e t ~ . ' ~ ~  Although such predictions are notoriously unreliable in 
general,129 they appear grotesque when they concern a person 
such as Randall Adams who never before in his life had engaged 
in antisocial or violent behavior. This is particularly the case 
when such testimony emanates from a witness - popularly 
known as "Dr. Death" or "Dr. Doom" - who in virtually every 
case testifies that the defendant is potentially dangerous and 
should be executed.130 Concerning witnesses like Grigson, Justice 
Blackmun observed that these self-proclaimed experts at  pre- 
dicting future dangerousness create "an aura of scientific infalli- 
bility,"131 making it difficult for the adversary process to "cut 
through the facade of superior kn~wledge" '~~ and thereby 
demonstrate the fraudulent nature of such testimony. 
See also supra note 68. 
126. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
127. Transcript, supra note 1, at  32-33. 
128. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
129. The American Psychiatric Association has characterized predictions of long- 
term future violence as "fundamentally very low reliability." Brief Amicus Curiae for the 
American Psychiatric Association at  12, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82- 
6080). Other authorities, based on overwhelming evidence, have reached the same con- 
clusion. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at  920-21 and n.2. See also People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 
3d 733, 767, 631 P.2d 446, 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 758 (1981) (such predictions are "un- 
reliable," "frequently erroneous," and "extremely prejudicial"). 
130. See Tybor, supra note 69, at  8. Cope, Predicting Future Violence, supra note 
69, at 82. "Grigson has testified about defendants' potential for violence in 119 capital 
cases, at times deeming defendants severe sociopaths certain to strike again. Only nine of 
those defendants have been spared the sentence of death." Id. (footnote omitted). See 
also J. WINSLADE & J. ROSS, supra note 69 at  167 (Grigson has testified in virtually every 
case that a capital defendant had been a sociopath). 
131. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at  926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Giannelli, The 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye u. United States, A Half-Century 
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980)). 
132. Id. at  932. 
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111. The Truth: The Artist's Version or the Law's Version? 
Art and law both claim to discover the truth. Law provides 
an adversary trial process to accurately determine the facts. Art 
also aspires to truth-finding, but is not hemmed in by eviden- 
tiary rules and legal processes. Film, as a form of art, is freer 
and more open to exploration and exposition. Law is objective, 
and its language is spoken and written. Film is subjective, and 
its language is visual, aural, and even tactile. Is either method 
inherently superior? Is law's method seriously flawed? The Thin 
Blue Line attempts to answer these questions. As an epistemo- 
logical adventure story, the film forces us to examine our views 
about the legal system's ability to uncover the truth. 
Through free-flowing monologues of the principal players in 
the case, the film critiques the basic precepts of law governing 
our system's fact-finding process. Thus, under our legal system, 
the police acquire evidence in a principled and nonarbitrary 
manner; defense counsel is a skilled and forceful advocate; the 
judge is neutral and detached; and the prosecutor serves justice. 
Presumably all relevant nonprivileged information is available to 
the fact-finder, such information is capable of testing through 
cross-examination, and fundamental principles such as the pre- 
sumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt guide the result. The film suggests, however, 
that things are not what the public assumes they are. In the 
Adams case these precepts were turned upside down, producing 
a flawed result. 
The first tenet of reliable fact finding is an efficient investi- 
gation in which all relevant evidence is acquired and no relevant 
proof is ignored.lS3 The homicide detectives violated this pre- 
cept. They are portrayed as aggressive, overzealous, and simple- 
minded. They become frustrated a t  failing to solve a cop-killing. 
Rather than continuing to carefully investigate leads - and 
there were several, most of which pointed to David 
Harris - the police became desperate enough to settle for an 
innocent man. Their selection of Randall Adams, a t  which time 
the adversary system began to crumble, is portrayed as brain- 
133. y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE. J. ISRAEL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 184-207 (6th 
ed. 1986). 
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less. The police believed Harris simply because he was a "nice 
kid." They disbelieved Adams because he "protested his inno- 
cence" and "didn't have a lot of remorse for what he had 
done."lS4 The film even suggests that the police chose Adams 
because Adams could be given the death penalty while Harris, as 
a juvenile, could not.ls" 
Another essential ingredient for reliable fact finding is an 
able defense lawyer.1Se The film's critique of Adams' attorneys 
reflects two popular views of the defense lawyer. Under one 
view, the lawyer is seen as a righteous, if necessarily ineffectual, 
champion of the poor and the powerless, representing the forces 
of good in the form of some socially just cause. This lawyer 
stands resolutely against the forces of evil, characterized by pow- 
erful government, a venal prosecutor, or an oppressive society. A 
film such as To Kill a Mockingbirdls7 captures this view. Under 
another and by no means mutually exclusive view, the lawyer is 
seen as a fighter, whose arena is the courtroom. Clarence Darrow 
and Perry Mason come to mind, as do films such as Inherit the 
WindlS8 and C o r n p u l ~ i o n . ~ ~ ~  Adams' lawyers fall into the first 
category only. They are portrayed as honorable and decent peo- 
ple, but naive, unaggressive, and easily manipulated. Edith 
James says: "I admit, I'm sort of a gullible person.""O Dennis 
White says: "Since his trial I have . . . given up my practice of 
criminal law. . . . I just feel like I'll let other people handle these 
problems . . . ."141 Accurate fact finding, the film suggests, re- 
quires at  a minimum a defense attorney who is not only decent 
and compassionate, as Adams' lawyers clearly were, but also ca- 
pable of fighting, and maybe of dirty fighting, if necessary. 
Adarns' lawyers plainly were no match for Dallas County's ag- 
gressive prose~utor .~ '~  
134. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
135. The Texas Penal Code states: "No person may, in any case, be punished by 
death for an offense committed while he was younger than 17 years." TEx. PENAL CODE 
ANN. 9 8.07(d) (Vernon 1989). 
136. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). 
137. Universal 1963. 
138. United Artists 1960. 
139. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1959. 
140. Transcript, supra note 1, at 17. 
141. Id. at 40. 
142. One of the grounds upon which the district court granted Adams' writ of 
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Trustworthy results also require a disinterested judge who 
can fairly and impartially run the show.'43 Here, the judge was 
biased and arrogant, unwilling and incapable of protecting 
Adams' rights. The judge's sympathy for law enforcement is ob- 
vious. To this man, judging a cop-killing case left little room for 
objectivity, and considerable opportunity for emotion. The judge 
characterized Adams as "only a drifter"'" and cried when the 
prosecutor referred to "the thin blue line of police that separates 
the public from anarchy."14Vhe film poses the questions: Is this 
the norm for judges? Did the judge do anything judicial here? 
The popular myth about the prosecutor is that he is "Mr. 
District Attorney," a "Champion of the People," a virtuous pro- 
tector, and even a "Minister of Justice."146 He or she has the job 
of ensuring that justice is served and the defendant dealt with 
fairly. We close our eyes to the possibility of a lawless official 
who, entirely unnoticed, can subordinate the rights of citizens to 
achieving personal victories.14' 
The film suggests that the relationship between the prose- 
cutor and justice is not what it seems. Allusions to the "Halls of 
Justice" and the "Scales of Justice" become ironic metaphors for 
the prosecutor's efforts to pervert the truth. Harris recalls the 
prosecutor warning him to deny that an immunity deal had been 
made.14s Harris notes that Justice "has got that blindfold on. We 
don't see what goes on behind the closed doors."14e The prosecu- 
tor "was deceiving the jury, see. He wanted to deceive Jus- 
t i ~ e . " ' ~ ~  Michael Randell later says: "That's why they call i t  the 
Hall of Justice - the scales are not balanced. The scales are in 
habeas corpus was the ineffectiveness of his counsel. The court found: "Counsel's con- 
duct so undermined the proper function of the adversary process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just and reliable result." Ex Parte Randall Dale Adams, 
No. W-77-1286-I(B) at  6 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd,  No. 70-787 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
143. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 
466, 470 (1933). 
144. Transcript, supra note 1, a t  21. 
145. Id. at  31. 
146. Mayer, 'Hogan's Ofice' Is a Kind Of Ministry of Justice, N.Y. Times, July 23, 
1967, 3 6 (Magazine), at  7. 
147. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
149. Transcript, supra note 1, a t  42. 
150. Id. 
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the hall and they go up and down. . . . So if the D.A. wants you 
to hang 15 or 20 years, you hung."lsl The film scans a list of 
defendants whom the prosecutor sent to the electric chair. There 
is an air of unreality to their guilt or their death. We are re- 
minded of the prosecutor's boast: "Any prosecutor can convict a 
guilty man; it  takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent 
man."ls2 The film makes this boast horribly real when we recog- 
nize that a "great" prosecutor brought Adams within one week 
of being executed. As a critique of capital punishment and of the 
prosecutor's power of life and death, the film is brutal. 
In addition to the integrity of the players, the system relies 
heavily on rules of evidence supposedly geared to enhancing the 
accuracy of verdicts. For example, the ability to show a witness' 
interest or bias is essential to legal fact finding.ls3 For Harris, his 
interest was his freedom; for the Millers it was reward money 
and the dropping of criminal charges against their daughter; for 
Michael Randell it was covering up an embarrassing liaison. 
While we see the effect this has on our view of the truth, so 
clearly discrediting these witnesses' testimony, we learn that 
none of this information was known to the jury. Cross-examina- 
tion, the law's greatest truth-enhancing device, was entirely 
worthless. If all this information remained hidden, the film asks, 
did the legal system do its job? 
Evidentiary rules also try to exclude unreliable proof, such 
as the Millers' eyewitness identification of Adams.ls4 The Millers 
testified that they picked Adams out of a line-up, but in the film 
they admit that they did not. Their inconsistent statements 
raise further doubts about the accuracy of their testimony. Most 
damning of all, however, are the filmed monologues of the 
Millers - a fascinating psychological portrait of vanity and ve- 
nality. How could a jury ever accept their testimony? The film 
suggests another question: How often does such proof support 
an erroneous verdict? 
Elaborating its thesis that things are not always what they 
appear to be, that blue may be red, or that a judge may not be 
151. Id. at 43. 
152. Id. at 40. 
153. See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text. 
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judicial, the film examines the "expert" psychiatric witness, 
whose contribution to the fact-finding process is popularly 
viewed as sacrosanct. The film's critique of Dr. Grigson turns 
this view upside down.156 Grigson is presented to a jury as an 
expert on "future dangerousness." His testimony has resulted in 
scores of defendants being sentenced to the electric chair. To 
impressionable juries he is oracular and infallible. Grigson asks 
Adams: "What is the meaning of a rolling stone gathers no 
Adams' answer seems normal, certainly in the main- 
stream, something we would say. But Grigson says Adams 
should die. Would Grigson diagnose us as sociopaths? Adams 
had no prior record, and no. history of violence. Would Grigson 
be able to send us to the electric chair? Is Grigson crazy? This is 
the law, the film tells us. Upside down and inside out. 
In the shadow of the electric chair, death chillingly pervades 
the film, depriving us of the safety of our assumptions that the 
law is capable of offering certainty and moral resol~t ion. '~~ In 
fact, the law speaks not in certainties but in probabilities that 
frequently end in morally and factually ambiguous results. The 
film incites us to demand certainty when the result is death. 
On a philosophical level, the film is a pictorial essay about 
knowledge and truth. The film tells us truth is unknowable and 
that what we "know" is merely our own version of the truth. 
The point comes through when the title The Thin Blue Line 
slowly changes from blue to red; it is vividly reinforced in the 
Roshomon-like restagings of the murder, reminding us that we 
cannot know what happened. The blurred outlines and changing 
reality are constant reminders that there is no absolute truth. 
Yet, by fusing together the cerebral and the sensual, the film 
gives us a feeling about truth and falsehood that we have never 
experienced before, certainly not from a novel, another film, or 
an actual trial. The film suggests that it can do a better job of 
ascertaining the truth by turning on the camera and the tape 
recorder, and by reordering reality so that time and space move 
155. See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
157. This popular need for certainty may be one of the reasons the public finds plea 
bargaining so morally offensive - it offers no morally acceptable resolution. In the 
same way, the ambiguous resolutions of several recent highly publicized trials intensify 
popular dissatisfaction with the law's inability to resolve disputes. 
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in different ways than those on which we have learned to rely. 
The free-flowing monologue reveals more than the law's custom- 
ary question and answer style of interrogation, although it is 
ironic that at  the film's climax - the near-confession of David 
Harris - the question and answer style is needed. 
The film's own version of the truth is not perfect. Spatial 
and temporal barriers are nonexistent. Cigarettes slowly accu- 
mulate in an ashtray to convey the passage of time when Adams 
is being interrogated. Wood's flashlight flies through the air in 
slow motion to accentuate his violent death. The free-flowing 
monologues are selectively edited, with more effective state- 
ments retained and even juxtaposed with visual images bearing 
no relation to the content of the statement. A good example is 
Harris' statement "I just took off'lS8 set against the restaging of 
the death car accelerating away from the scene. From its con- 
text, Harris' statement more logically referred to his "taking off' 
from home. Banner headlines, used as chapter headings, are 
meant to convey "objective" truth. The musical score is so pul- 
sating and intense that it is impossible to believe that the film 
would be effective without it. 
In the end, although the film provides a version of the truth 
superior to the official version, things are again not what they 
seem. This is the final irony in a film filled with ironies. The film 
"solves" the case. It satisfies the popular desire for certainty and 
moral rightness. But while we are relieved that Adams has been 
exonerated, we do not really know if he has been. We are sure he 
is innocent, but will the law let him go? The film, as art, gives its 
version of the truth. But the official version remains intact. The 
film has convinced us that we know the better "truth" but that 
it may make no difference. 
IV. Conclusion 
In documenting a Texas capital murder case, The Thin 
Blue Line places the audience in the jury box and by providing 
additional data, raises searing questions not only about the jus- 
tice of the verdict, but also about the ability of the adversary 
system to work when a prosecutor distorts and suppresses cru- 
158. Transcript, supra note 1, at 44. 
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cia1 facts. Having shown the fact-finding process as untrustwor- 
thy, easily manipulated, and inadequate, the film presents the 
artist's view of the truth, and becomes a visual meditation on 
truth itself. 
As this article was being completed, a district judge in 
Texas recommended a new trial for Adams.lS9 That decision was 
unanimously affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap- 
peals.leO On March 21, 1989, after being incarcerated for twelve- 
and-one-half years, Adams was released from jail. Two days 
later, the Dallas District Attorney's Office announced that it 
would not retry Adams because "it lacked sufficient credible evi- 
dence against him."lel 
159. On December 30, 1988, after an evidentiary hearing, District Judge Baraka 
granted Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus and recommended that Adams 
receive a new trial. On January 5, 1989, pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the district court certified the findings of fact and con- 
clusions of law to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which by law must review those 
findings and conclusions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Judge Baraka's 
decision. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). 
160. Id. 
161. Belkin, Dallas Will Not Retry Man in Killing of Policeman, N. Y. Times, Mar. 
24, 1989, at All ,  col. 1 (quoting Dallas District Attorney John Vance). 
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